When elementary quantl.IIII systems, such as polarizea photons, are used to tran911it digital information, the uncertainty principle gives rise to novel cryp tographic phenaoena unachieveable with traditional tranS10ission noedia, e.g. a c0111111unications channel on which it is i11possible in principle to eavesdrop without a high probability of disturbing the trans •ission in such a way as to be detected.
Such a quantum channel can be used in conjunction with or dinary insecure classical channels to distribute random key infor11ation between two users with the assurance that it reiuins unknown to anyone else, even when the users share no secret infonu.tion ini tially. we also present a protocol for coin-tossing by exchange of quantWII noes sages, which is secure against traditional kinds of cheating, even by an opponent· with unlinited computing power, but�ironi cally can be subverted by use of a still subtler quant1.1111 phenoaoemon, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen par adox.
I. Introduction
Conventional cryptosystems such as ENIGMA, DES, or even RSA, are based on a mixture of guess work and mathematics. Infonu.tion theory shows that traditional secret-key cryptosystems car.not be to tally secure unless the key, used once only, is at least as long as the cleartext. On the other hand, the theory of computational complexity is not yet well enough understood to prove the computational security of public-key cryptosystems.
In this paper we use a radically diffP.rent foundation for cryptography, viz. the uncertainty principle of quantum physics. In conventional in for11ation theory and cryptography,· it is taken for granted that digital communications in principle can always be passively monitored or copied, even by someone ignorant of their noeaning. However, when information i� encoded in non-orthogonal quantum states, such as single photons with polarization directions 0, 45, 90, and 135 degrees, one obtains a conununications channel whose transmissions in prin ciple cannot be read or copied reliably by an eaves dropper ignorant of certain key information used in forming the transmission. The eavesdropper cannot even gain partial information about such a trans11is sion without altering it a random and uncontrollable way likely to be detected by the channel's legiti mate users. Quantum coding was first described in (W), along with two applications: ..aking 110ney that is in principle impossible to counterfeit, and multiplex ing two or three messages in such a way that reading one destroys the others. Hore recently JBBBW), quantum coding has been used in conjunction with public key cryptographic techniques to yield several sche...,s for unforgeable subw�y tokens. Here we show that quantum coding by itself achieves one of the main advantages of public key cryptography by per mitting secure distribution of random key informa tion between parties who share .no secret information initi_ ally, provided the parties have access, besides the quantum channel, to an ordinary channel suscep tible to passive but not active eavesdropping. Even in the presence of active eavesdropping, the two parties can still distribute key securely if they share some secret information initially, provided the eavesdropping is not so active as to suppress connunications completely. We also present a proto col for coin tossing by exchange of quantum 11es sages. Except where otherwise noted the protocols are provably secure even against an opponent with superior technology and unli11ited COftputing power, barring fundamental violations of accepted physical laws.
Offsetting these advantages is the practical disadvantage that quantum transmissions are neces sarily very weak and cannot be amplifi�d in transit. Moreover, quantum cryptography does not provide di gital signatures, or applications such as certified 11ail or the ability to settle disputes before a judge.
II. Essential Properties of Polarized Photons
Polari%ed light can be produced by sending an ordinary light beam through a polari%ing apparatus such as a Polaroid filter or calcite crystal; the beam's polarization axis is determined by the orien tation of the polarizing apparatus in which the beam originates. Generating single polarized photons is also possible, in principle by picking them out of a polari%ed beam, and in practice by a variation of. an experinient [I\GR) of Aspect, et. al.
Although polarization is a continuous varia ble, the uncertainty principle forbids measurements on any single photon from revealing more than one bit about its polarization. For example, if a light beam with polarization axis a is sent into a filter oriented at angle P, the individual photons behave dichot01110usly and probabilistic�lly, being transmit ted with probability cos 2 (a-P) and absorbed with the comple11entary probability sin 7 («-P). The photons behave deterministically only when the two axes arc parallel (certain transmission) or perpendicular (certain absorbtion).
If the two axes are not perpendicular, so that some photons are transmitted, one might hope to learn additional infor111ation about a by measuring the transmitted photons again with a polarizer ori ented at some third angle; but this is to no avail, because the transmitted photons, in passing through the P polarizer, enoerge with exactly P polariza tion, having lost a, 11 memory of their previous po larization a.
Another way one might hope to learn more than one bit from a single photon would be not to measure it directly, but rather son,ehow amplify it into a clone of identically polarized photons, then perform measurements on these; but this hope is also vain, because such cloning can be shown to be inconsistent with the foundations of quant .
um mechanics [WZ) .
Formally, quantum mechanics represents the internal state of a quantum system (e.g. the polari zation df a photon) as a vector + of unit length in a linear space H over the field of complex num bers (Hilbert space). The inner product of two vec tors <♦It>, is defined as ! j ♦ j •+ j • where• indi cates complex conjugation. The dimensionality of the Hilbert space depends on the �ystem, being larg er (or even infinite) for more complicated systems. Each physical measurement H that might be performed on the system corresponds to� resolution .of its Hilbert space into orthogonal subspaces, one for each possible outcome of the measurement. The num ber of possible outcomes is thus limited to the dimensionality d of the Hilbert space, the most compiete measurements being those that resolve the Hilbert space into d 1-dimensional subspaces.
Let M k represeht the projection operator onto the k'th subspace of measurement H, so that the identity operator on H can be represented as a sum of projections: I• M 1 +H 2 + ..•. When a system in state + is subjected to measurement H, its behavior is in general probabilistic: outcome k occurs with a probability equal to IH k t1 2 , the square of the length of the state vector's projection into sub space H k . After the measurement, the system is left in a new state H k t/lH k tl, which is the nomalized unit vector in the direction of the old state vector's projection into subspace N k . The measure ment thus has a deterministic outcome, and leaves the state vector unmodified, only in the exceptional case that the initial state vector happens to lie entirely in one of the orthogonal subspaces characterizing the measurement.
The Hilbert space for a single polarized pho ton is 2-dimensional; thus the state of a photon may be completely described as a linear combination of, for example, the two unit vectors r 1 • (1,0) and r 2 = (0,1), representing respectively horizontal and vertical polarization.
In particular, a photon po larized at angle a to the horizontal is described by the state vector (cosa, sina).
When subjected to a n,easure�ent of vertical-vs.-horizontal polari zation, such a photon in effect chooses to become horizontal with probability cos 2 a and vertical with probability sin 2 a.
The two orthogonal vectors r 1 and r thus a e;;:emplify the resolution of a 2-dimen�ional Hilbert space into'2 orthogonal 1-dimensional subspaces; henceforth r 1 a� r 2 will be said to comprise the 'rectilinear' basis for the Hilbert space.
An alte�native basis for the same Hilbf>rt space is provided by the two 'diagonal' basis vec tors d 1 • (0. 707 ,0.' 707), representing a 45-degree photon, and d 2 • (0.707,-0.707), representing a 135-degree photon. TWo bases (e.g. rectilinear and diagonal) are said to be 'conjugate' (WI, if each �ector of one basis has equal-length projections onto all vectors of the other basis: this means that a system prepared in a specific state of one basis will behave entirely randonly, and lose all its stored infol'.lllation, when subjected to a 111easurement corresponding to the other basis. Owing to the com plex nature of its coefficients, the two-dimensional Hilbert space also admits a third basis conjugate to both the rectilinear and diagonal bases, comprising the two so-called 'circular' polarizations c 1 • (0.707,0.707i) and c 2 • (0.707i,0.70"1); but the rectilinear and diagonal bases are all that will be needed for the cryptographic �pplications in this paper.
The Hilbert space for a compound system is construct�� by taking the tensor product of the Hil bert spaces of its components; thus the state of a pair of pht>t:t>ns is characterized by a-unit vector in the 4-dim�nsional Hjlbert space spanned by the or thogonal 6asis vectors r 1 r 1 , r 1 r 2 , r 2 r 1 , and r 2 r 2 . This formalism �ntails that the state of a compound system is not generally expressible as the cartesian product of the states of its parts: e.g. the ·Einstei' n-Podolsky-Rosen state of two photons, 0.7071(r 1 r 2 -r 2 r 1 ), to be discussed later, is not equivalent to . any product of one-photon states.
lll. Quantum Public Key Distribution
In traditional public-key cryptography, trap door functions arc used to conceal the nteaning of messages between two users from a passive eavesdrop per, d�pite the lack of any initial shared secret information between the two users. In quantum pub lic key distribution, the quantum channel is not used directly to send meaningful messages, but is rather used to transmit a supply of randOffl bits be tween two users who share no secret information ini tially, in such a way that the users, by subsequent consultation over an ordinary non-quantum·channel subject to passive eavesdropping, can tell with high ,probability whether the original quantum transmis sion has been disturbed in transit, as it would be by an eavesdrooper (it is the quantum channel's pe culiar virtue to compel eavesdrappinq to be active).
If the transmission has not been disturbed, they agree to use these shared secret bits in the well known way as a one-time pad to conceal the meaning of subsequent meaningful convnunications, or for oth er cryptographic applications (e.g. authentication tags) requiring shared secret random information.
If transmission has been disturbed, they discard it and try again, deferring any aeaningful-ca,nunica tions ur.til they have succeeded in transmitting enough random bits through the quantum channel to serve as a one-time pad.
In more detail one user ('Alice') chooses a random bit string and a random sequence of polariza tion bases (rectilinear or dia7onal). She then sends the other user (Bob) a trai_ n of photons, each representing one bit of the string in the basis cho sen for that bit position, a horizontal or 45-degree photon standing for a binary zero and a vertical or 135-degree photon standing for a binary 1, As Bob receives the photons �e decides. , randomly for each photon and independently of Alice, whether to meas ure the photon's rectilinear polarization or its diagonal polarization, and interprets the result of the measurement as a binary zero or one. As ex plained in the previous section a random answer is produced and all information lost wh-en one attempts to measure the rectilinear polarization of a diago nal photon, or vice versa. Thus Bob obtains mean ingful data from only half the photons he detectsthose for which he guessed the corre' ct polarization basis. Bob's information is further degraded I>¥ the fact that, realistically, some of the photons would be lost in transit or would fail to be counted by Bob's imperfectly-efficient detectors.
Subsequent steps of the protocol take _ place over an ordinary public communications channel, as sumed to be susceptible to eavesdropping but not to the injection or alteration of messages. Bob and Alice first determine, by public exchange of mes sages, which photons were successfully received and of these which were received with the correct basis. If the quantum transmission has been und•isturbed, Alice and Bob should agree on the bits encoded by these photons, even this data has never been dis cussed over the public channel. Each of these pho tons, in other words, presumably carries one bit of random information (e.g. whether a rectilinear pho ton was vertical or horizontal) known to Alice and Bob but to no one else. The need for the public (non-quantum) channel in this scheme to be immune to active eavesdropping can be relaxed if the Alice and Bob have agreed be forehand on a small secret key, which they use ·to create Wegman-Carter authentication tags [WCI for their messages over the public channel. In more detail the weqman-Carter multiple-message authenti cation scheme uses a small random key to produce a 11essage-dependent 'tag' (rather like a check sum) for an arbitrary large message, in such a way that R t D diagonal photons in the quantum transmission, any eavesdropping carries the risk of altering the transmission in such a way as to produce disagree ment between Bob and Alice on some of the bits on which they think they should agree. Specifically, it can be shown that no measurement on a photon in transit, by an eavesdropper who is informed of the photon's•original basis only after he has performed his measurement, can yield more than 1/2 expected bits of information abo�t the key bit encoded by that photon; and that any such measurement yielding b bits of expected information (b s 1/2) must induce a disagreement with probability at least b/2 if the measured photon, or an attempted forgery of it, is later re-measured in its original basis. (This opti_ mum tradeoff occurs, for example, when the ea vesdropper measures and retransmits all intercepted photons in the rectilinear basis, thereby learning the correct polarizations of half the photons and inducing disagreements in 1/4 of those that are lat er re-measured in the original basis.)
Alice and Bob can therefore test for eaves dropping by publicly comparing some of the bits on which they think they should agree, though of course this sacrifices the secrecy of these bits. The bit positions used in this comparison should be a random subset (say one third) of the correctly received bits, so that eavesdropping on more than a few pho tons is unlikely to escape detection. If all the comparisons agree, Alice and Bob can conclude that the quantum transmission has been free of signifi cant eavesdropping; and those of the remaining bits that were sent and received with the same basis also agree, and can safely be used as a one time pad for subsequent secure communications over the public channel. When this one-time pad is used up, the protocol is repeated to send a new body of random information over the quantum channel.
The following example illustrates the above proto col.
an eavesdropper ignorant of the key has only a small probability of being able to generate any other va lid message-tag pairs. The tag thus provides evi dence that the message is legitimate, and was not generated or altered by someone ignorant of the key.
(Key bits are gradually used up in the Wegman-Carter scheme, and cannot be reused without compromising the system's provable security; however, in the present application, these key bits can be replaced by fresh random bits successfully transmitted through the quantum channel.) The eavesdropper can still prevent communication by suppressing messages in the public channel, as of course he can by sup pressing or excessively perturbing the photons sent through the quantum channel. However, in either case, Alice and Bob will conclude with high proba bility that their secret communications are being suppressed,. and will not be fooled into thinking their communicaticns are secure when in fact they're not.
IV. Quantura Coin Tossing
'Coin Flipping by Telephone' was first dis cussed by Blum [Bl] . The problem is for two dis trustful parties, communicating at a distance with out the help of a third party, to come to agree on a winner and a loser in such a way that each party has exactly 50 per cent chance of winning. Any attempt by either party to bias th,, outcome should be de tected by the other party as cheating. Previous protocols for this problem are based on unproved assumptions in computational complexity theory, •·nich makes them vulnerable to a breakthro'-lgh in algorithm design.
By contrast, we present here a scheme 1.nvolv-1.ng classical a11d quantcim messages which is secure �gainst traditional k1.nds of cheating, e"vcn by. an opp onerot with unlimited computing power. Ironical ly, it can be subverted t.y a still subtler quantwr. ph"!n@,tnon, the so-called !;;instein-Podolsky-Rosen Effect. This threat is merely theoretical, be1.:;ius,· it req'-lircs perf�ct effi�1.ency of storage and cietec tion of photons. •;hich though not imposs1.hle in irincipl.:, is ta.: ::ieyond the capahil1.ties of current A) ice's bit stri ?"lq... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ ,   I-lice's random b.Ji .. is ........................... :-le ........................... 1 his am-:iunts tc c!istingushing a t:·ain of photon,; ::c:.ndomly J:-: ilarizc-d in one basis from a tra1.r, randor., ly polarized i� another basis. Ht.'wever, it can be shown that an:; rneasux-ing apparatus capable of making this distinction ccn also be used, i'> conj:.inction • �; � h the Einstein-Podols�y-Rosen effect descr ib<:d �, :-: ,w to transmit usef1.<l informatio•, faster than tl1e sps,�j of light, in violation of well-establis. 1€d physical laws.
Alice could attempt cheating either at step 1 o� step"· Let us first a�s=e that she follo,s s::ep 1 honestly and finds herself losing at the end ;: step L, because Bob made he correct guess, here ··:.. ... cliniear. In order tc pretend she has won, she 0 ++ D 0 0 0 technology. The honestly-followed protocol, on the other hand, could be realized with current technolo gy.
1. Alice chooses randomly one basis (say rectilinear) and a sequence of random bits (one thousand should be sufficient). She then encodes her bits as a sequence of photons in this same basis, using the same coding scheme as before. She sends the result ing train of polarized photons to Bob.
2. Bob chooses, independently and randomly for each photon, a sequence of reading bases. He reads the photons accordingly, recording the results in two tables, one of rectilinearly received photons and one of diagonally received photons. Because of losses in his detectors and of the transmission channel, some of the photons may not be received at all, resulting in holes in his ta�les. At this time, Bob makes his guess as to which basis Alice used, and announces it to Alice. He wins if he guessed correctly, loses otherwise.
3. Alice repor.ts to Bob whether he won, by telling him which basis she had actually used. She certif ies this information by sending Bob, over a classi cal channel, her entire original bit sequence used in step 1.
�
Bob verifies that no cheating has occurred by comparing Alice's sequence �ith both his tables. There should be perfect agreement with the table corresponding to Alice's basis and no correlation with the other table. In our example, Bob can be confident that Al.ice's original basis was indeed rectilinc -.:: as claimed.
Illustrating the protocol by a specific example, would need to convince Bob that her photons were :Hagonally polarized, which she can only do by prod ucing a sequence of bits in perfect agreement with Bob's diagonal table. This she cannot do reliably becaus" thicc table i!l the result of probab.i.listic behavior of the photons after the left her hands. Suppose she goes ahead anyway and sends Bob a new 'original' sequence, different from the one that she used in step 1, in hopes that it will by luck agree perfectly with Bob's diaognal table. This atte11Pt to cheat requires Alice to be not only lucky but daring, because in the vast majority of cases, the gamble would fail and would be detected as cheating. By contrast, in traditional coin-tossing schemes, analogous attempts to seize a lucky victory frOft the jaws of defeat, though unlikely to succeeed, are unaccompanied by any danger of detection.
It is easy to see that things are even worse for Alice if she attempts to cheat in step 1, by sending a mixture of rectilinear and diagonal pho tons, or photons which are polarized neither rectil inearly or diagonally. In this case she will not be able to agree with either of Bob's tables in step 3, since both tables will record the results of proba bilistic behavior not under her control.
In order to say how Alice c�n cheat using quantum mechanics it is necessary to describe the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) effect [Bo,AGR), often called a paradox because it contradicts the common sense notion that for two individually random events happening at distance from one another to be corre lated, some physical influence must have propagated from the earlier event to the later, or else from some c0111111on random cause to both events.
The EPR effect occurs when certain .types of atom or molecule decay with the emission of two pho tons, and consists of the fact that the two photons are always found to have opposite polarization, re gardless of the basis used to observe them, provided both are observed in the same basis. For example, if both Photons are 111Casured rectilinearly, it will always be found that one is horizontal and the other vertical, though which is horizontal will vary ran domly from one decay to the next. If both photons are measured diagonally, one will always be 135degree and the other 45-degree. A moment's reflec tion will show that this behavior cannot be ex _plained by assU111ing the decay produce� a distribution over a of oppositely polarized (a and a+901 photons, since, in that case, if such a pair of pho tons were measured in an intermediate basis (say a+45), both would behave probabilistically so as to sometimes come out with the same polarization.
Probably the simplest, but paradoxical sounding, verbal explanation of the EPR effect is to say that the �wo photons are produced in an initial state of undefined polarization; apd when one of them is measured, the measuring apparatus forces it to choose a ·polarization (choosing randomly and equiprobably between the two characteristic direc tions offered by the apparatus) while simultaneously forcing the other unmeasured photon, no matter how far away, to choose the opposite polarization. This iaplausible-sounding explanation is supported by formal quantum mechanics, which represents the state of a pair of photons as a vector in a 4-dimensional Hilbert space obtained by taking the tensor product of two 2-dimensional Hilbert spaces. The EPR state produced by the decay is descrioed by the vector 0.7071(r 1 r 2 -r 2 r 1 ), and the EPR effect is explained by the fact that this vector has anticorrelated pro jections into the 2-dimensional Hilbert spaces of the two photons no matter what �asis is used to ex press the tensor product (e.g. the same state vector is demonstrably equal to 0. 7071 (d 1 d 2 -d 2 d 1 ) , and to 0.7071(c 1 c 2c 2 c 1 )).
In order to cheat, Alice produces a number of EPR photon-pairs instead of individual random pho tons in step 1. In each case she sends Bob one mem ber of the pair and stores the other !·c-rself, per haps bet,.een perfectly reflecting mi rr-=r·,. When Bo::-makes his guess (e.�. n,ctilinear) she then measure■ all her stored pt.otcr!S 1, th,, opposite (diagonal) basis, thereby obtain..r.: ,:-esults perfectly correlat ed with his diac;c-nal tc1t 1-, b·1t uncorrelated with his rectilinear table. She t�· ::r. announc�s these re sults, pretending th,,m tc, ·:e �he random bits she was supposed to have enccxkc _,. the r"hotons in step 1, and thereby for�es a win .'. ·;,m which Bob cannot es cape even by delaying his mr,,,•·urements until after his guess. This cheat requ.i. 1:.-s that Alice be able to store the twin photons fc-r 3 considerable time and then measure them wit!, hcqh detection efficien cy, and thus woulrl be pos"j ::• · 0 only in principle, not in practice. Any pholons lost by Alice during storage or measurement would result in holes in her pretended bit sequence, which she would have to fill by guessing, and these guesse3 would risk detection by Bob if they failed to agr•?c, with his tables.
